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Dangerous Supplements: Resistance and Renewal in Jurisprudence (1991), edited
by Peter Fitzpatrick, is the first instalment in a new series, Law and Social Theory,
being published by the progressive British publisher Pluto Press.1 As someone
who had been subjected to an intensely positivistic-perhaps even authoritarian
jurisprudential, undergraduate education in Belfast, both the title and the dustcover
intrigued me. The latter portrays a towering, seemingly unassailable, citadel with
"jurisprudence" inscribed upon it, being bombarded by paper planes with the
insignia of critical theory, semiotics, feminism, postmodernism and "new ideas."
This image led me to wonder whether the book would signal a counterhegemonic
breakthrough that would destabilize conventional British legal theoretical wisdom.2
The answer, I think, is an unfortunate, but potentially promising, "not yet."
The book is relatively short (218 pages in all, including a quite useful index)
comprising only seven essays. As is often the case in jurisprudential collections,
the essays are of uneven quality. The stronger ones, in my opinion, are those by
Fitzpatrick, Thomson, Hunt and Smart; the weaker ones are by Sugarman, Goodrich
and Hachamovitch and Carty. More specifically, several of the essays pay
insufficient attention to the theme of being a dangerous supplement to conventional
jurisprudence. Perhaps just a little more editorial prodding would have been in
order. Furthermore, it is not totally clear as to who the contemplated target market
might be. Some of the essays appear to be introductions and overviews to certain
perspectives, thereby suggesting an anticipated student audience, while other
essays are more like "performances" of particular perspectives thereby suggesting
an anticipated academic audience. Once again, a little more editorial guidance
would not have gone amiss.
1.

2.

Forthcoming titles encompass: critical analyses offamily, tort, land, trusts and contract
law, as well as work on law in the information society, a jurisprudence ofrace, class and
gender, and a potentially intriguing Critical Lawyer's Handbook.
I say this in full recognition that some excellent progressive jurisprudential scholarship
has emerged from Britain in the last decade or so, but also with the awareness that this
has remained peripheral because of the domination of neo-positivist jurisprudence.
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It is neither possible nor appropriate to engage in a full discussion with each of
the contributors to the collection, so in this review I propose to briefly highlight
the general nature of each of the inquiries and then to interrogate their conception
of the appropriate ambitions of progressive jurisprudence. More specifically, I
will argue that although each of the essays goes a long way in "demythifying"
conventional jurisprudential wisdom on an intellectual level, at the level of the
politics of legal education, they do not go far enough. The essays fall short in that,
first, they are too historically retrospective;3 second, their collective embracement
of at least one strain of postmodemism renders them a tad too cautious; and third,
they are insufficiently specific in their proposals for reconstruction. Consequently,
the essays are less dangerous to the traditional canons of jurisprudence (and the
power elites who perpetuate those canons) than the authors might hope. Thus, the
dustcover image of paper on basalt may be only too accurate.
The first essay, by Peter Fitzpatrick, both elaborates on the idea of "dangerous
supplements" and demonstrates how the technique can work through a
deconstruction of "the supreme text of jurisprudence, H.L.A. Hart's The Concept
of Law"(p. 2). There is much to be said for Fitzpatrick's critique of Hart, first,
because it provides a reply to the perennial complaints of noo-positivists and
liberals that they are not taken seriously by "crits"' and second, because it
provides an excellent illustration of the incoherence of liberal thought. However,
although I thoroughly appreciated the actual exercise of desedimentation, I was
left wondering as to the purpose. The danger with merely supplementing (even if
it is critical) is that, in this case, positivism remains centre stage and the critic's
focus is retrospective to a text that was produced in 1961, even if it is one with a
pervasive, continuing influence. As a result, Fitzpatrick has little to say about
alternative interpretive structures and he provides little by way of guidance as to
how we might proceed once we have witnessed the "self-destruction" (p. 3) of
The Concept ofLaw.
This concern about what Fitzpatrick has to offer in place of Hart goes to some
of the core thematic issues of the book: what role is the jurisprudential sceptic to
play in a discipline that is premised upon and demands fidelity? Is the sceptic's
role simply one of resistance? Should there even be attempts at renewal? The way
that Fitzpatrick constructs the first two sentences of the book-"Jurisprudence is
the theorized prejudice of lawyers. Its proponents strive to ensure the viability of
law and to maintain law's authority" (p. 1)--suggests that jurisprudence and law
3.

I am not suggesting here that legal historical analysis is not valuable, for certainly the
past can tell us much about where we currently are and how we might proceed. Rather,
my point is one of emphasis, and I think that in this book insufficient analysis is paid to
the links between the past, present and future.

4.

See for example Donald Galloway, "Critical Mistakes" in Richard Devlin, ed., Cana
dian Perspectives on Legal Theory (Toronto: Emond Montgomery, 1991) at 255, and
my reply "Doubting Donald" (forthcoming).
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are unsalvageable. However, in his conclusion, Fitzpatrick is somewhat more
guarded, positing that the book's exploration of the "subversive implications of
excluded knowledges for jurisprudence . . . is done not just to resist jurisprudence
as it stands but to provide perspectives in its renewal" (p. 27). The problem with
Fitzpatrick's own essay, indeed all the essays in the book, is that these strategies
for renewal are dramatically underdeveloped. The deconstruction of the dominant
voice without more does little to proactively enhance or make space for the voices
of the excluded.
Now there is a good postmodern reason why Fitzpatrick et al. are wary of
articulating what their proposed visions of renewal might be: to do so runs the risk
of establishing "an alternative orthodoxy or general truth of law" (p. 30). This is a
position with which I have much sympathy, for the dangers of creating new
hierarchies of knowledge and power are pervasive and subtle. But I think that
Fitzpatrick and his co-contributors get the balance wrong, for critique is not
enough. Like it or not, law and jurisprudence are deeply entrenched components
of the social psyche and we need more about how things could be otherwise and
perhaps a less exclusivist focus on negation. All scholarship is a form of advocacy
and it seems to me that if those who are progressive wish to persuade their
audience (student or academic) to be similarly inclined, then it is necessary to
provide indications of what could be. Modesty and self-restraint are commendable
jurisprudential qualities, but they are not incompatible with a progressive politics
of law that delineates reconstructive possibilities mediated by an openness to self
reflexivity. So, for example, in Fitzpatrick's case it is clear that he is concerned
about the racist underpinnings and consequences of Hartian jurisprudence (pp.
16-17). Even a tentative indication of what an anti-racist jurisprudence and legal
regime might look like may not only be more dangerous but also more persuasive.5
Besides, even if conventional liberal jurisprudence a la Hart does implode, even
if Fitzpatrick is successful in his deconstruction, that does nothing necessarily to
create space for "excluded knowledges" because the resultant jurisprudential void
can easily be filled by the voices of the new right, as Thomson's essay on Hayek

5.

One counter argument to my suggestion here is, given that Fitzpatrick is not a member
of those communities who suffer the negative impact of racist structures, it is neither
possible nor desirable for him to develop positive anti-racist programmes. Given the
cultural construction of the "self-Fitzpatrick," for him to articulate the perspective of the
other would be to assimilate or appropriate that "otherness."This doubt as to "imperial
scholarship" [Richard Delgado, 'The Imperial Scholar: Reflections on a Review of
CivilRightsLiterature"(l984) 132U.Pa.L.R. at561] is always a real concern, but there
are possibilities. For example, one could float an idea, fully acknowledging-even
highlighting-one's own status, that is developed in consultation with "the others," and
is introduced into the discursive economy contingently and is admitted to be "up for
grabs." Or, one could acknowledge or refer to proposals developed by "others" as to
possible anti-racist strategies.
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demonstrates. A commitment to resistance uncomplemented by proposals for
renewal may be a commitment to infinite regression. There is certainly no shortage
of liberal and conservative pretenders.
From the first essay in the book, I want to briefly turn to the last two essays,
because similar concerns surface. The penultimate essay, ''Time Out of Mind: An
Introduction to the Semiotics of the Common Law" by Peter Goodrich and Yifat
Hachamovitch analyzes the mythical origins and iconic discourse of the common
law to highlight the historically contingent and socially constructed nature of
some of the foundational elements of the common law of privacy, private property
and liberty. Anthony Carty's "English Constitutional Law from a Postmodern
Perspective" through a "deconstructive" interpretation of Hobbes, Hooker,
Blackstone, Burke and Dicey argues that the received traditions of English
constitutional law are pervaded by repressed contradictions.
While I learned a significant amount from both essays, I also found them
frustrating. Both essays are, in a sense, jurisprudential archaeological digs which
(through the use of different interdisciplinary tools) have unearthed significant
aspects of the pre- and early history of the English legal tradition that have
hitherto been buried. But the strongly historical and extremely textual focus of
both essays leads me to ask, once again, in what way are they "dangerous" to the
current theories and practices of law? To the extent that they demonstrate the
contingent, pasted-together and political dimensions of the English legal tradition
they are destabilizing of the dominant jurisprudential ideologies. But beyond this,
I am puzzled. In relation to Goodrich �d Hachamovitch's essay, what is the
potential contribution of semiotics to a renewed jurisprudence? Are we to transcend
the semiotics of law, or are we to construct new more progressive and inclusive
legal symbols? Is there even a role for the subject "we"? In relation to Carty's
essay, once we recognize through the prism of postmodemism that modem
positivism is contradictory because it has failed to escape its premodem religious
influences, what are we to do with this knowledge? Does it suggest ways in which
our jurisprudence and law can be opened up to the religious diversity of societies
such as England or Canada? Carty is silent on such issues. Once we unpack the
unifying impulse that underlies the English constitutional heritage, what does that
mean for those who want to confer legal and constitutional recognition on their
differences? Again, Carty is silent on such issues.
However, Carty does provide some indication as to why he is silent on questions
such as these. For him, the postmodern mandate is constrained: ''The task of the
postmodern critic is the easy one of tracing the pre-modem ghosts in cracked
skeletons of modernity" (p. 198). Indeed, any form of normative reconstruction
seems to be the furthest thing from Carty's mind for he argues:
The particular form of poststructuralism upon which I am engaged is simply to
show, as a matter of historical fact, that the soul has gone out of a culture, that what
we are studying are fossils, ghosts, dead memories (p. 184).
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To which I would reply in the concluding words of Carty's own essay: "Why?
What is the point?" (p. 206). Where and what is the danger? To push this concern
further, drawing on Thomson's essay, I wonder if Carty's position is all that far
removed from Hayek's proposition that we should "plan to resist all planning"
(p. 91). And if we don't plan, are we likely to do anything? In short, Carty's
position reminds me of the ·arch-deconstructionist, Derrida, and his critique of an
essay by Walter Benjamin, that it is pervaded by a "terrible ethico-political
ambiguity."6
The other essays in the collection provoke somewhat similar concerns, but less
intensely. David Sugarman's "'A Hatred of Disorder': Legal Science, Liberalism
and Imperialism" is an attempt to demonstrate how the traditional methodologies
and parameters of legal thought in England were contingent upon the peculiar
intellectual and institutional circumstances of the period 1850-1907, and how
these have had a profoundly constraining impact upon current legal academic
practice. While the essay ripples with insight, it is unfortunately quite unpolished.
The introduction is patchy, the core of the essay tends, at times, to be assertive
rather than persuasive or illustrative in tone, and the references, which took on a
heightened significance given these other problems, required one to seek out
another essay published in 1986. The problem was that at least one reference
which I hoped to pursue-"Pick 1989" (p. 62)--<;ould not be traced. Most of
these problems stem from the fact that Sugarman's essay is a melange of several
other pieces he produced in the 1980s. Given the importance of Sugarman's
earlier contributions, it is a pity that the synthesis is not smoother for the result
could have been a very impressive contribution.
In spite of these criticisms, I found the essay extremely informative. It has
certainly helped me to have a better understanding of why legal education and
legal pedagogy, both in Britain and North America, have ended in the lamentable
state in which they now find themselves. However, once again, Sugarman does
little to provide guidance as to how we might escape the current predicament.
Apart from a brief footnote mention to the reconstructive propositions of Roberto
Mangabeira Unger (p. 65), Sugarman seems to agree with Robert Stevens that:
despite repeated efforts to break out of its iron cage, legal education was and is
unlik ely to transcend the profession-oriented forces that have controlled most law
schools most of the time (p. 63).

The intriguing and more destabilizing questions, however, are why only "most
schools most of the time"? Why not all schools all of the time? Which schools, in
which conjunctures and by what means, have managed to deviate? These requests
should not be understood as the typical reviewer's lament that a better book or
6.

Jacques Derrida, "Force of Law: The Mystical Foundation of Authority" (1990)
CardozoL.R. 921 at 1025.

218

Reviews!Recensions

essay could have been written if different questions had been asked. Rather, they
go to the core of what Sugannan is attempting to deal with, that is, an explanation
of the hegemony of a cenain politico-intellectual worldview. But hegemony is
just that, hegemony, and not totality.Yet we are given little indication of why this
worldview has not been total. If, however, Sugannan had attempted to address
explicitly these issues, issues that are latent within the analysis that he does
provide, we would have received a double benefit: not only would we have been
provided with some inkling of ways to break out of the "iron cage" but also, the
essay itself would have provided a more cogent explanation as to the nature of the
contemporary problem.
An intriguing inclusion in the book is Alan Thomson's ''Taking the Right
Seriously: The Case of Hayek," which I found to be one of the best written, well
organized and persuasive contributions. There are, however, two points that I do
want to address. The first inquires: why should an essay on Hayek, even if it is by
a leftist, be considered a dangerous supplement? Thomson provides two possible
answers. The primary respo nse is that Hayek helps us to recognize that
"jurisprudential 'truths' cannot be divorced from general political and moral
po sitions" (p. 94). This is undoubtedly true, but the same can be done with any of
the mainstream liberal jurisprudes, without committing rare and valuable critically
dangerous space to the right.7 Thomson's second reason, that Hayek reveals
"jurisprudence not as a superior, privileged and more profound truth about law,
but as at best a merely systematic expression of what lawyers have discovered
works in practice" (p. 95), could also just as easily be made by discussing "and
thereby enlightening us about" left jurisprudence.
The reason this curious commibnent of resources disconcerts me relates to a
more serious comment on Thomson.Thomson, importantly in my opinion, points
out that "Hayek's vision of life without meaning is becoming a self-fulfilling
prophecy" (p. 93). One would have thought that, given Thomson• s concern about
Hayek's importance, this would generate the response from the progressive
scholar "What is to be Done?" Swprisingly. this question does not even get asked.
Having raised the possibility of a Hayekian dystopia, Thomson immediately
drops it to "revisit" the much less pressing question of why Hayek has been
ignored by mainstream jurisprudence.
The reason for this failure to engage is, once again, to be found in the self
imposed shackles of what might be called "postmodern idealism." Thomson
wants to avoid rearticulating any "royal road to truth"(p. 95), for he prefers to
simply "anticipate the 'post' modem" (p. 72). It seems to me that there are real
problems here because, overcome by vertigo, the best that Thomson can come up
7.

To be clear, I am not suggesting that the left should ignore the right, for undoubtedly that
would be foolhardy given the current politico-historical context of both Britain and
North America. Rather, my point is one of contextualism: in the British jurisprudential
environment, liberalism and neo-positivism are the dominant discourses.
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with is that jurisprudence should aspire to facilitate a variety of conversations
based on gender, coloniz:ation, socialism and, it would seem on the basis of this
essay, even Hayekian liberalism. This, however, ignores the reality that
conversations are circumscribed and pervaded by power relations, and, in fact,
ensures the victory of market place ideology, with its inherent logic of
monopoliz.ation. Conversations cannot be enough for progressives, nor can we
simply anticipate "the postmodem."Rather, "the postmodern'" must be constructed,
"indeed struggled for," and the role of a progressive jurisprudence is to make
tentative and corrigible suggestions as to how, when and where we might proceed
in the creation of these alternative socio-political and juridical relations and
structures. Note, however, that this is not simple instrumentalism, nor does it
require a faith in reason, nor an impulse to universalism, minimal or otherwise.
Rather, a responsible postmodern jurisprudence can be suggestive of localized,
particular and strategic interventions that seek to destabilize the power of those
who have, and to make space for those who have not.9 A good example of what I
8.

One of the more problematic elements of several of the essays in the book is that
although they espouse "postmodemism." very little is provided in terms of what the
al,lthors mean by this concept Given that this is a contested concept, such a gap in the
work leaves the reader unsure as to some of the key elements of the authors' positions.
Clearly, this is not the occasion to attempt to map out the different themes, components
and debates within postmodemism. but I want to be clear that mine is not a critique of
postmodemism per se, rather it is a concern with some variants of it It seems to me that
one of the great achievements of postmodern analysis is that by highlighting the
incommensurability of difference it helps us to recognize the inevitability of radical (in
the Greek sense of "going to the root of') heterogeneity. In so doing in the context of
law, politics and jurisprudence, it helps to decentre the perspective and normativity of
whitist. Eurocentric male thought thereby creating space for the articulation of perspec
tives of those who, traditionally, have been the feared "other": women. people of colour,
First Nations people, the dispossessed. For elaborations of further discussions of these
points in relation to politics and law, respectively, see Iris Marion Young, Justice and
the Politics of Difference (Princeton; Princeton University Press, 1990); Martha
Minow, Making All the Difference (Ithaca, N. Y.: Cornell University Press, 1990).

9.

It is obvious that I am still operating on the assumption that there is a role for "human
agency" and some might object that this is premised on a humanistic/modernist
conception of. the self that is incompatible with postmodern conceptions of the
fundamentally contingent self. It seems to me, however, that to recognize anti
essentialism and the relational self does not lead to an eradication or annihilation of the
self, but rather that it is simply reconstituted to whatSeyla Benhabib (following Adorno)
calls a "situated self' [''Critical Theory and Postmodernism: On the Interplay of Ethics,
Aesthetics and Utopia in Critical Theory" (1990) 11 Cardozo L.R. 1435 at 1445].
Because this situated self is located in the interaction of the multitude of relations, there
are endless opportunities for such a self to participate . . . though there is no guarantee
that its actions will be uncontroversial or effective. Those questions will depend upon
a host of other variables. Indeed, I might go further to suggest that because the situated
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am suggesting here is to be found in Gerry Frog's "The Ideology of American
Law"10 which also adopts the idea of dangerous supplements but takes it much
further so as to suggest alternatives to the power relations that pervade contemporary
corporate and administrative structures.
Alan Hunt's essay, "Marxism, Law, Legal Theory and Jurisprudence" caused
me less concern than some of the others, possibly because it is closer to my own
heart. It is a well written, nicely structured overview of some of the key themes of
marxist jurisprudence and is about as accessible as you can get in a jurisprudential
regime dominated by liberal legalism. Moreover, Hunt is quite persuasive in his
argument that a relational theory of law is explanatorily superior to other marxist
approaches, and he deals succinctly with the issues of the relationship between
law and ideology, law and state, economic relations and law, and law and class.
Less persuasive, however, is his discussion of the relationship between marxism
and gender, but this is hardly surprising given the complexity of the issue.
Hunt appears to be somewhat less smitten with the postmodern bug than all of
the other contributors to the book. Though he is clear that marxist legal theory
should play an "oppositional role" (p. 103) he also indicates that a more positive
posture should be developed. For example, when he critiques commodity form
theory, he rejects the idea of the "withering away of law" and suggests the need
for socialist laws. Furthermore, at the end of the essay he points out that one of the
problems with the regimes of the now defunct eastern bloc was that they lacked
"democratic law." The problem is that Hunt provides little in the way of concrete
analyses of what "socialist" or "democratic" laws might mean, but at least there
appears to be something of the promised renewal. Nor would this have required
another essay. Hunt has written several other articles on the role of rights discourse
and brief illustrations from these could quite easily have been used to provide
suggestions as to how we might proceed.11 In this way, he could have taken us one
step beyond vague aspirationalism to provide not just a supplement but the
tentative outline of an alternative jurisprudential vision.
Carol Smart's essay, "Feminist Jurisprudence" also provides indications of
reconstructive energy, guarded though they may be. The essay is an historical
selfis in relation with other selves-i.e., that it is in part constituted by and itselfconstitutes
such other selves-that one has responsibilities to them. In other words, because of its
interdependence with others the situated self has a responsibility to engage.
10. (1984) 97 Harvard L. R. at 1277.
1 1. This is not to be interpreted as suggesting that I think that "rights discourse" is the
appropriate way to go. Rights discourse itself can be deconstructed to highlight its
ethnocentric bias, as Mary Ellen Turpel has demonstrated in her "Aboriginal Peoples
and the Canadian Charter: Interpretive Monopolies, Cultural Differences" in Richard
Devlin, ed., Canadian Perspectives on Legal Theory (foronto: Emond Montgomery,
1991) at 503. My point is that at least Hunt is making some suggestions as to how we
might, in the words of Spike Lee, "do the right thing."
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overview and conceptual introduction to feminism that, in spite of its brevity, is
remarkably comprehensive. Moreover, the essay combines the quality of being
very accessible to those who are unfamiliar with feminism with cogent and clearly
developed criticisms of feminist arguments with which Smart disagrees. Particularly
helpful is her abandonment of the traditional categorizations of feminism, with
the polarization these have often implied, and Smart's tentative development of a
new conceptualization around the following approaches: master theory;
experiential/epistemological; psychological/modes of reasoning; and social justice/
harm.
But the essay is not without its problems. For· example, Smart posits that
Catharine MacKinnon's jurisprudence is "not concerned with concepts of equality
or fairness" (p. 14 1). The latter perhaps not, but the concept of equality is pivotal
to MacKinnon's argument. Also, I have concerns about the polarized way in
which Smart constructs the feminist engagement with jurisprudence: "it has
become clear that what is required is either a radical transformation or an
abandonment of jurisprudence altogether" (p. 133). There is no indication of mere
supplementation here. It's all or nothing. How.ever much I might want to agree
with Smart's ambitions, I think that in the current historico-political conjuncture a
"radical transformation" in the foreseeable future is unlikely, but that
"reconstructive deviationism"12 is potentially feasible. The resort to the dualistic
either/or may foreclose too many options that feminists may wish "perhaps even
need " to pursue.
Moreover, it is still not clear to me what is to be the nature of the "radical
transformation" that Smart calls for. Specifically, I found it quite challenging to
figure out Smart's own position in relation to each of the subcomponents of her
reconceptualization of feminist jurisprudence. After her criticisms, it was difficult
to know what she had abandoned and what she had retained. For example, at
times, she seems to indicate that there may be some "agreed feminist principles"
(p. 156) "though they remain unspecified" and yet simultaneously, she suggests
that these might be impossible given the profound differences between women on
the basis of their race, class and context This sensitivity to the key differences
between women, in tum, leads Smart to suggest that perhaps law and jurisprudence
are part of the problem of domination and that the quest for feminist jurisprudence
is mistaken because it retains law as a central focus. My response to this is
twofold. First, in relation to every social practice that feminists confront there are
likely to be profound conflicts.13 This however, cannot be a reason for abdication,
elsewise there would be no location for feminist activism. Second, while we
12. See more generally, Roberto Mangabeira Unger, Politics (New York: Cambridge
University Press, 1987).For a suggestion of the utility of deviationism to feminism, see
my "On the Road to Radical Reform" (1989) 29 Osgoode Hall L. J. at 641.
13. See, for example, Marilyn Hirsch and Evelyn Fox Keller, eds., Conflicts in Feminism
(New York: Routledge, 1990).
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should be careful not to fetishize law, it would equally be a mistake to abandon it
because, as the essays by Goodrich and Hachamovitch and Carty demonstrate,
law is both symbolically real and everywhere. The trick is to know when to resist,
when to ignore and when to renew law. One task of progressive legal theory is to
help us make those necessarily local and strategic choices.
Now the contributors, or at least some of them, may wish to resist my request
for paying greater attention to the development of. strategies of renewal. They
might want to argue that such a plea domesticates and deradicalizes the
fundamentally challenging insights that postmodemism and deconstruction pose
for both law and jurisprudence. They might suggest that my desire for reconstructive
insights is born of the hubris of the jurisprudential discipline which seeks to
translate and thereby subordinate and co-opt all other disciplines to its agenda.
Fitzpatrick raises this concern (but does not fully develop it) 14 in the opening
paragraph of his essay, when he quotes Twining's concern that "the essential
nature of the process is for someone to venture forth from the intellectual milieu
of the law and to come back with spoils from elsewhere and to present them in
assimilable form" (p. 1).
This is a legitimate and cautionary concern, but it seems to me that the question
of "what is to be done" is not primarily a jurisprudential question. Rather, it is an
ethico-political one, and the answer might be, as Carol Smart points out in her
book Feminism and the Power of Law15 but not so clearly in her essay, that in
certain contexts you may wish to use law and jurisprudence, while in other
circumstances you may not. Thus, the proposition that greater emphasis needs to
be focused upon what those who are progressive might do after the decoding does
not necessarily imply that legal agendas are essential. Nonetheless, we must not
forget that law plays an extremely important constitutive role in the interplay of
contemporary social relations, and in the same way as it did not "wither away" in
pseudo-marxist societies, I doubt if it will "wither away" just because it can be
deconstructed. Moreover, I believe that there is a real danger in being too deferential
to postmodern thought, because to do so may, paradoxically, result in installing it
as a new "master narrative," unresponsive and unaccountable. By inquiring as to
what postmodernism may have to offer in facilitating the creation of alternative,
radically heterodox, socio-political alternatives "in which I believe law will be at
least a part," a double purpose is reserved: first, postmodernism's own potential
for self-indulgence is destabilized; and second, we might just find that it does
have something to contribute.16 At the very minimum, there is no harm in asking.
14. For a much more elaborate version see Pierre Schlag "Le Hors de Texte C'est Moi"
(1990) 11 CardozoL.R. at 1631.
15. London: Routledge, 1989.
16. For examples of several efforts within literary criticism which pursue such an approach
(though not always successfully) see Jonathan Arac, ed., Postmodernism and Politics
(Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1986); Terry Eagleton,Literary Theory:
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The problem with Dangerous Supplements is that despite its subtitle-Resistance
and R�newal in Jurisprudence-in the main, it does not ask such questions. As a
result, the title promises more than the book produces. Despite the fact that the
essays are dangerous in that they do much to challenge the dominance of the neo
positivist mindframe of so much contemporary jurisprudence, for my taste they
are not dangerous enough. because insufficient attention is paid to renewal.
An/nJroduction (Minneapolis: University ofMinnesota Press, 1983); FredericJameson.
The Political Unconscious: Narrative as a Socially Symbolic Art (Ithaca: Cornell
University Press, 1981 ); and Frank Lentricchia, Criticism andSocial Change (Chicago:
University of Chicago Press, 1983).

224

